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Article 2

By John R. Snowden.*

The Case For A Doctrine of
Provocation in Nebraska
I.

INTRODUCTION

Secure among the doctrines of the criminal law is the notion
that malice is the distinguishing feature of any homicide to be punished as murder.1 The doctrine of provocation 2 negates or excuses
the malice of the actor and the unlawful homicide is punished as
manslaughter rather than murder.3 The law of Nebraska obliquely
recognizes the doctrine of provocation, but judicial opinion confuses the partial excusing defense of provocation with the statutory definition of the manslaughter offense.4
*

1.

2.

3.
4.

Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. The author wishes to
thank Jerry Gosch for his research assistance during the summer of 1981.
See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, CRnmuNAL LAW 528-30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE & SCOTT]; R4 PERKINS, CmuMNAL LAW 34-35 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as PERIms]. "Malice aforethought is the characteristic mark of all murder, as distinguished from the lesser crime of manslaughter which lacks it."
Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 774 (3rd Cir. 1966).
In this Article malice means: (1) an intent to kill; (2) an intent to do serious bodily injury; (3) an intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of
the obvious likelihood of causing death or serious bodily injury; and (4) an
intent to do a named felony under a "felony-murder rule." LAFAVE & ScoTT,
supra, at 528-61; PERKINS, supra, at 34-45; People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299
N.W.2d 304 (1980).
"By provocation we mean the power possessed by some kinds of things and
events external to human beings, of arousing in them desires by which they
are moved to particular acts." Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide I, 37 CoLus. L REv. 1261, 1280 (1937).
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 1, at 571-86; PEmuis, supra note 1, at 51-70; 1
WHARTON'S CRImINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 271-89 (R. Anderson ed. 1957).
E.g., Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 176, 87 N.W. 34, 38 (1901); State v. Rowe, 210
Neb. 419, 425, 315 N.W.2d 250, 253 (1982). "[P]rovocation is not an element of
manslaughter (whether voluntary or involuntary), but a defense to second
degree murder." United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923,943 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(emphasis in original).
The confusion of the provocation defense and the manslaughter offense
may be hard to avoid since a successful defense yields not an acquittal, but
conviction of the lesser homicide offense. Interestingly, the law has not yet
given doctrinal recognition to the notion of provocation partially excusing
non-homicide offenses, e.g., a first-degree assault that was provoked might be
partially excused to second-degree assault. See generally English, Provoca-
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The doctrine of provocation is the traditional analytical device
for distinguishing between murder and manslaughter in cases of
intentional homicide. 5 To make this distinction in a rational and
just way it is important that the doctrine be clearly articulated and
nourished by proper instruction in the cases. This has not been
the Nebraska experience.
This Article suggests that the Nebraska bar and bench should
overtly recognize and develop the provocation doctrine. Toward
this goal, the Article will first place provocation in the context of
homicide jurisprudence by a brief overview of its doctrinal role.
Second, the Nebraska treatment of the doctrine will be explored.
Third, a benchmark articulation of the doctrine will be offered. Finally, a discussion of the issues that will illumine and be illumined
by the doctrine is presented. To rethink and argue the case for a
doctrine of provocation is the task of the lawyer who is required to
take some responsibility for the condemnation and imprisonment
of his fellow human beings as criminals. 6
II. THE DOCTRINAL ROLE OF PROVOCATION
Once the word is found argument begins. Provocation begins
as an argument over the Anglo-Saxon root of "malice." The argument occurred because a lawyer believed that his client was morally distinguishable from another lout who had previously killed a
person. The lawyer suggested that the facts of the previous case
could be characterized as involving a killing par malice prepense.
Such a killing was obviously one which did not admit of excuse or
justification.7
But, the lawyer's client had killed in a sudden fight between
persons of quality. It was a "chance-medley."8 In any number of
causes a person of quality might be drawn into a sudden fight, and
in such circumstances the normal inference from the act of killing
to the actor's state of mind and character was precluded. 9 The law
tion and Attempted Murder, 1973 CRilm. L. REV. 727 (1973) (a synopsis of England's law on this issue). But see Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 A.D. 781
(1862) (provocation a defense to assault with intent to murder).
5. See Coldiron, HistoricalDevelopment of Manslaughter,38 Ky. UJ. 527 (194950). See also, Exodus 21:12-36; Deuteronomy 4:41-42; 22:22.
6. G. FLETCHER, RETHNMNG CRImiNAL LAW 875 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
FLETCHER].

7. See Kaye, The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter1, 83 LAw Q. REV.
365, 369-70 (1967).
8. Apparently this is noted in the Norman "chaud melee." See L. WERRE,,
Cmm iAL LAw 66-68 (3d ed. 1980).
9. "[I]t matters not what the cause be, whether real or imagined, or who draws
or strikes first; provided the occasion be sudden, and not urged as a cloak for
preexisting malice." 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 241 (1803). See W. LOM-
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should have compassion for this human being, the lawyer argued,
and the common law responded.
Here are the seeds of a general theory of excuse manifested in
the particular argument that the intentional unjustified killing in a
sudden fight was less culpable and legally distinguishable from another homicide. First, the common law recognized what has become a fundamental premise, that the substantive offense must
reflect a concurrence of mental state, mens rea, and act, actus
reus.1 0 Second, circumstances of the killing in a sudden fortuitous
fight made the argument that the law could not comfortably infer
that the act was done par malice prepense, "Wickedly," "wilfully,"
or "without lawful excuse."" Third, the circumstances restricted
the actor's freedom of choice and whatever intent arose was a limited temporal distortion of an otherwise good person.12 Finally, because of the involuntary force of circumstances, the law in
compassion toward an equal would specify an excuse which would
allow the actor to be convicted of a lesser offense, manslaughter,
rather than the capital crime of murder.13
At one time people of quality wore side arms as a matter of
course and matters of honor were settled by less disguised and
more personal violence.14 The Statute of Stabbingl5 attempted to
impose an end to this way, but life and the common law prevailed.16 Howeve-, simultaneously the imposed order was reflected in the order of just expectations. The common law began to
ask whether or not the cause of the sudden fight was such "provocation" that the resulting homicide would be manslaughter rather

10.
11.
12.
13.

BARD, EIRENARCHA 248 (1614 ed.); Kel. 55, 84 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1666) (directions
for Justices of the Peace); Royley's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 254 (1612). See generally Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600,74 MICH. L.
REV. 413 (1976); Snelling, Manslaughter Upon Chance-Medley, 31 AusT. L.J.
102 (1957).
The notion of chance-medley, killing in a sudden fight from fortuitous
cause, had its demise in England in Rex v. Semini, [1949] 1 K.B. 405.
LAFAvE & ScoTt, supra note 1, at 7. See also Green, supra note 9 (an historical development of the degrees of killing with emphasis on its early development in England).
Kaye, supra note 7, at 369.
See FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 798-802; H.LA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSMIILrY 22-24 (1968); ARIsToTLE, ETHICA NIcOMACHEA lll0a (W.D. Ross
trans. 1925).
FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 807-10. In sketching the doctrinal role of the
chance-medley root of provocation the author has adopted much of Fletcher's
general theory of excuses for its background. See id. at 798-817; see also
Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
1269 (1974).

14. 3

STEPHEN, A IIISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

15. 1 Jac. 1, ch. 8 (1604).
16. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 14, at 47-50.

59 (1883).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:565

-than murder.17 Thus, the focus shifted from the sudden fight into
which a person of honor might be drawn to the provoking nature of
the cause of the fight.18
The general theory of the partial excuse remained the same.
Due to constricted choice from temporally limited involuntary circumstances an intent to kill was aroused which compassion required the law to recognize as less culpable. But, the normative
focus of circumstances shifted from the sudden fight to the provoking act.
Evidence of serious provocation would rebut this presumption [malice]
by introducing a more probable cause: the incident originated in the provocative conduct of the deceased, which in turn aroused violent passions
in the accused. The accused's conduct could therefore be attributed to
weakness of control or human frailty rather than to true wickedness. 19

Hale accordingly inquired, "[W] hat is such a provocation, as will
take off the presumption of malice in him that kills another....
By the first years of the eighteenth century the English courts
had ruled various forms of provocation to be adequate or inadequate to rebut a finding of malice. Lord Chief Justice Holt in his
opinion in Regina v. Mawgridge2l categorized the types of adequate or inadequate provocation 22 and distinguished provocation
from chance-medley. In Mawgridge, the accused and the deceased
had a verbal argument, whereupon the accused threw a bottle at
the deceased, which struck the deceased's head. The deceased
rose, threw a bottle at the accused, and the accused gave the deceased a mortal blow with his sword. This killing was adjudged to
be murder, having been done with malice aforethought, even
though done upon sudden quarrel. Lord Holt reasoned that
neither the deceased's words nor his lawful retaliation to the accused's initial attack would be adequate provocation.
17. See id. at 57-72; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 191; 3 COKE INsTrruTs 55
(1809); 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 453 (1847); Coldiron,
supra note 5, at 534, Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation,35 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 292, 292-97 (1976); Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CIum. L, CERIiNOL-

OGY &POLICE Sci. 391, 411-427 (1946).
18. See Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation
as a Defense to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 310-11
(1963).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Ashworth, supra note 17, at 295.
1 HALE, supra note 17, at 455.
Kel. 119, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107 (1707).
Adequate provocation was: (1) any striking of the accused; (2) angry words
followed by an assault; (3) the sight of a friend or relative being beaten;
(4) the sight of a citizen being unlawfully deprived of his liberty; and (5) the
sight of a man in adultery with the accused's wife. Inadequate provocation
was:

(1) words alone; (2) affronting gestures; (3) trespass to property;

(4) misconduct by a child or servant; and (5) breach of contract. Id. at 130-38,
84 Eng. Rep. 1112-15.
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The doctrine of provocation was now well established in law. 23
It would from this point live in the world of ideas taking on the
normative debates of the culture adopting it and the world of
events would drive the law to refine and qualify this partial excuse
as the legal actors who defined and punished wrong doing imprisoned or killed fellow citizens. 24
Im. THE DOCTRINE OF PROVOCATION IN NEBRASKA
In Nebraska all crimes are defined by statute and the articulation of a substantive offense is the province of the legislature. 25
However, the common law power of the judicial branch may recognize and define defenses. 26 The Nebraska judiciary has recognized
the doctrine of provocation but its function and role is confused by
the courts' misplaced reliance on the bare language of the manslaughter offense. First, the Nebraska statutory scheme for the
grading and punishment of homicides must be set out. Then, the
importance of the provocation doctrine and its function may be understood as it is manifested in the statutes and cases.
28-303. Murder in the first degree; penalty. A person commits murder in
the first degre- if he kills another person (1) purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or (2) in the perpetration of or attempt to
perpetrate any sexual assault in the first degree, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking of any public or private means of transportation, or burglary, or (3) by administering poison or causing the same to be done; or if
by willful and corrupt perjury or subornation of the same he purposely
procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person. The determination of whether murder in the first degree shall be punished as a
Class I or Class IA felony shall be made pursuant to sections 29-2520 to 292524.
28-304. Murder in the second degree; penalty. (1) A person commits
murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation.
23. This brief sketch of the doctrinal role of provocation has focused on a narrow
view of law and community. Of course, the notion of provocation exists wherever human beings seek to join together. E.g., Winnebago v. Cheyenne reported in K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 140-46

(1941).

24. "[D]octrinal disputes are not arid and aimless fights about narrow doctrinal
points, but rather a stylized struggle over basic issues of principle." FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 875.
25. "All crimes are statutory in this state." Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb.
777, 782, 104 N.W.2d 227,231 (1960). See generally Abrahams & Snowden, Separationof Powers and Administrative Crimes: A Study ofIrreconcilables, 1
So. ILI. L.J. 1, 12-40 (1976).
26. The insanity defense is a creature of Nebraska common law. Schwartz v.
State, 65 Neb. 196, 91 N.W. 190 (1902); State v. Long, 179 Neb. 606, 620, 139
N.W.2d 813, 821 (1966). See State v. Ransburg, 181 Neb. 352, 148 N.W.2d 324
(1967) (entrapment); State v. Brown, 174 Neb. 393, 118 N.W.2d 332 (1962)
(intoxication).
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(2) Murder in the second degree is a Class 1B felony.
28-305. Manslaughter; penalty. (1) A person commits manslaughter if he
kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the
death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful
act.
27
(2) Manslaughter is a Class III felony.

Murder in the first degree is punished by life imprisonment or
death. Murder in the second degree is punished by a sentence of
ten-years-to-life. Manslaughter is punished by a sentence of oneyear-to-twenty-years imprisonment, or a fine of up to 28
twenty-five
thousand dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment.
Recently, in State v. Rowe,29 the defendant was convicted of
murder in the second degree and appealed arguing that the failure
of the trial court to instruct on manslaughter upon his request was
error. The Supreme Court of Nebraska found that the trial court
erred in not submitting to the jury the lesser-included offense of
manslaughter along with the charge of murder in the second degree. 30 The opinion illustrates the problem faced in Nebraska
when the role of the provocation doctrine is neglected.
In Rowe the accused testified that he had been out for an evening of beer drinking and dancing and came home about 11 p.m.
27. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-303 through 305 (Reissue 1979). For the purposes of this
Article's discussion, the Nebraska homicide statutes have not changed significantly since at least 1873. At that time the State adopted the so-called Pennsylvania division of murder into first and second degree which began with the
Pennsylvania statute of 1794. PERKiNs, supra note 1, at 88-89. The current
definition of manslaughter was also established.
In 1867 the first legislature had defined manslaughter with specific reference to provocation:
SEC. 21. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice, express or implied, and without any deliberation
whatever. It must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion,
caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion
irresistible or involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a
lawful act without due caution or circumspection.
SEC. 22. In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an
attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on
the person killing.
SEC. 23. The killing must be the result of that sudden violent impulse of passion, supposed to be irresistible; for if there should appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation
given and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity
to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and
punished as a murder.
Part III, §§ 4-21-23, Statutes of Nebraska (1867).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105 (Reissue 1979). In 1979 the penalty for manslaughter
increased from a maximum of ten to a maximum of twenty years.
29. 210 Neb. 419, 315 N.W.2d 250 (1982).
30. Id. at 426, 315 N.W.2d at 255.
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He did not disturb his wife, the deceased, because she was in another bedroom sleeping and had to rise about 4:30 a.m. to get ready
for work. He fell asleep in their usual bedroom and later awoke
upon hearing a noise. When he went to investigate he found the
deceased at the bottom of some steps, unconscious and bleeding
from the nose. He attempted to revive her but failed. He wanted
to join her and attempted to shoot himself but the weapon did not
fire. He then mutilated her body with a sharp instrument and set
their house on fire. He denied ever having struck his wife prior to
the mutilation and he argued that the mutilation and burning were
the results of a "brief reactive psychosis." 31 That is to say, that
upon finding his wife apparently dead he went crazy, mutilating
her body, attempting to kill himself, and setting fire to their house.
The state's case, through the testimony of a pathologist, argued
that the deceased's skull injury would have ultimately caused her
death; that the skull injury was more likely the result of a blow to
the head than a fall, and that in any event the actual immediate
cause of death was the loss of blood caused by the defendant's admitted mutilation of the body.3 2
The defense and prosecution both offered expert testimony on
the issue of legal insanity.
In considering whether or not a manslaughter instruction was
required, the court began with the basics. '"The difference between
murder in the second degree and manslaughter, as defined in the
first clause of section 28-305, is the absence of malice." 33 The court
then defined malice. "Malice denotes that condition of mind which
is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse."34 Certainly, an intent to kill manifests malice.3 5 What then would negate the malice manifested in an inten31. Id. at 423, 315 N.W.2d at 254.
32. Id. at 422-23, 315 N.W.2d at 254.
33. Id. at 425, 315 N.W.2d at 255. See State v. Beers, 201 Neb. 714, 271 N.W.2d 842
(1978). In the discussion of the voluntary manslaughter charge Beers is the
authority used throughout by the court.
For the purpose of this Article concern is focused solely on the first clause,
the voluntary manslaughter offense of § 28-305. See 1 WHARToN's CR MNAL
LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 272-75 (R. Anderson ed. 1957); Boche v. State, 84 Neb.
845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909). The defendant in Rowe also argued for a manslaughter instruction on the basis of involuntary manslaughter, causing the death of
another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. The
court quite properly found the failure to instruct on such involuntary manslaughter to be error. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 425-26, 315 N.W.2d 250, 255
(1982).
34. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 424, 315 N.W.2d 250, 255 (1982).
35. Malice was defined for the purpose of this Article, supra note 1, as (1) an
intent to kill; (2) an intent to do serious bodily harm; (3) an intent to do an act
in wanton and reckless disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing death
or serious bodily injury and (4) an intent to do a named felony under a "fel-
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tiona136 killing so that it would be with just cause or excuse?
may exist where the killing occurs upon sud"Absence of malice
37
den quarrel."
Now a fine line or huge gap appears. An intentional killing
without premeditation is murder in the second degree. Yet, an intentional killing upon a sudden quarrel squares with the absence
of malice allowing a conviction of manslaughter. What should be
the offense here:
A:
B:
A:
B:
A:

How about a cup of coffee together?
I've told you to leave me alone.
Come on, let's be friends. Have some coffee.
You're a creep. Leave me alone!
Drop dead! BANG. BANG.

Is the jury free to choose, without some notion of a just and
morally defensible distinction, which defendants are to be found
guilty of second degree murder and which manslaughter? Almost
every intentional killing, not premeditated or deliberated, which
may be imagined may be said to occur upon a sudden quarrel.
Without an understanding of the law's provocation doctrine the
jury is either denied its role as finder of fact and conscience of the
community or forced to intuit justice in an inarticulate
consciousness.
The Rowe court found that there was circumstantial evidence
from which the jury could conclude that the killing was the result
of a sudden quarrel:
The defendant came home after a night of drinking and dancing. He found
his wife not in the bed which they customarily shared, but in another
room. His sexual desires were urgent. (He acknowledged he was naked
when all the events at the residence transpired). Fulfillment of his desires
ony-murder rule." In many jurisdictions any of the first three manifestations
of malice may suffice for a second degree murder case. However, malice of
types (2) and (3) are currently questionable as sufficient in Nebraska. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-402 (Reissue 1975) with NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-304
(Reissue 1979). See Note, Is Purpose or an Intent an IndispensibleElement of
Murder in Nebraska? 33 NEB. L REV. 481 (1954).
In Nebraska, type (4) malice is only applicable to first degree murder. But
see People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965);
Anno., 50 A.L.R.3d 397 (1973) (a discussion of inherently dangerous felonies
for purposes of the felony-murder doctrine).
36. Voluntary manslaughter involves an intentional killing, but the malice, intent
to kill, is excused. 1 WHARTON'S CRMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE § 274 (R. Anderson ed. 1957); LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 572; PEl aUs, supra note 1,
at 52; Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909). Cf., State v. Worley, 178
Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965) (manslaughter- killing of another without
malice); Skinner v. Jensen, 178 Neb. 733, 135 N.W.2d 134 (1965) (manslaughter. unlawful but unintentional killing of another); Fisher v. State, 154 Neb.
166, 47 N.W.2d 349 (1951) (manslaughter unintentional killing of a person
without malice).
37. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 425, 315 N.W.2d 250, 255 (1982).
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was rejected. This resulted in a quarrel,the result of which was his strik38
ing his wife with a hammer.

What then would the court say as to A in the hypothetical above?
What could be said without some notion of provocation?
Rowe is not a case where the court strays from the course of
doctrine and practice. It is simply a current example of a long
habit of confusing the provocation doctrine of the common law and
the statutory definition of the manslaughter offense. Although the
state's first criminal code specifically defined manslaughter in
terms of provocation and heat of passion, that language was
dropped and the current language, "kills another without malice,
," was adopted in 1873.39
either upon a sudden quarrel ....
Ten years later in Bohanan v. State,40 the supreme court was
asked to consider whether the trial court had erred in failing to
give the defendant's requested manslaughter instruction that if
the killing was done, "upon a sudden quarrel and in the heat of
passion, they should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter
only."4 ' Although the facts of the homicide are not given in the
opinion, the court found no error in failure to instruct on manslaughter because it incorrectly concluded that provocation, heat
of passion, related to an inadvertent rather than intentional killing.42 Clearly, the manslaughter statute then and now describes
two distinct notions and provocation functions to partially excuse
an intentional killing.43
The supreme court did not explicitly deal with provocation
again until the case of Savary v. State44 in 1901. In Savary, the
defendant had been upbraided by the deceased for breaking up a
card game and generally not treating him right. The deceased left
the area and a little while later became embroiled in an argument
and scuffle over a stick of wood with another man when the de38. Id. at 425, 315 N.W.2d at 255 (emphasis added). But see Braunie v. State, 105
Neb. 355, 180 N.W. 567 (1920) (no evidence of provocation in the record);
Wright v. State, 169 Neb. 497, 100 N.W.2d 51 (1959) (language alone is no justi-

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

fication for the killing of another).
See note 27 supra. See also Preuit v. People, 5 Neb. 377, 384 (1877).
15 Neb. 209, 18 N.W. 129 (1883).
Id. at 214, 18 N.W. at 131.
Id. at 215, 18 N.W. at 131.
Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909).
62 Neb. 166,87 N.W. 34 (1901). During the time between Bohanan and Savary
the court did consider two cases which suggest a recognition of the notion
that an apprehension of danger of death or great bodily harm insufficient to
establish self-defense may nevertheless be an adequate provocation to reduce the intentional killing to manslaughter. Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40
N.W. 420 (1888); Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895). See note 109 &
accompanying text infra. See also Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N.W. 699
(1895).
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fendant came up behind them and struck the deceased a mortal
blow on the side of the head with a wagon spoke. The defendant's
conviction for first degree murder was affirmed by the court. 45
However, in the opinion the court approved a manslaughter instruction which was phrased in terms of provocation:
This court instructs this jury that under this information you can; and the
court instructs you that it is your duty to find this defendant guilty of manslaughter if you believe from the evidence before you beyond a reasonable
doubt that the fatal blow was struck unlawfully, but without malice and
while the defendant was under the influence of passion and in the heat of
blood produced by an adequate and reasonable provocation and before a
reasonable time had elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to control.
But if on the other hand you have any reasonable doubt of the guilt of this
defendant it is your duty to find him not guilty. 46

Nebraska law was recognizing the traditional provocation doctrine
as to adequacy and leaving the question of adequacy to the jury.
Additionally, the traditional requirement that the death dealing
act must occur before a reasonable time had elapsed in which the
actor might cool off from the provocation, was found to be encompassed within the statutory language. 47 The court was interpreting
the "sudden quarrel" language of the statute as referring to the
provocation doctrine. The doctrine would not be so clearly articulated again. However, the court would reaffirm the doctrine while
distinguishing the voluntary and involuntary manslaughter
clauses of the statute.
This reaffirmation occurred in Boche v. State.48 In Boche the
accused had shot the deceased after a long night of drinking as the
deceased was attempting to get the accused into a hack for a ride
home. Boche was charged with first degree murder and convicted
of manslaughter. On appeal he argued that he could not be found
guilty of manslaughter because the state had not shown that he
45. Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 176-80, 87 N.W. 34, 38-39 (1901).
46. Id. at 176, 87 N.W. at 38. The court noted that it could well be doubted
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the instruction.
It should also be noted that although the instruction raises the issue of
provocation in a clear way, it may confuse as to the burden of proof. The
defendant should not have to prove provocation to the satisfaction of any
standard of proof, but once the defense has produced the issue the state must
prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt. See note 73 & accompanying text
infra. See also United States v. Murdock, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
47. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 579-81; PERKINS, supra note 1, at 67-69.
48. 84 Neb. 845, 122 N.W. 72 (1909). A few years before Boche the court decided
the leading case arguing for the proposition that an imperfect right of selfdefense, arising from the provoking circumstance of fear, would reduce an
intentional killing under such conditions to manslaughter. Lucas v. State, 78
Neb. 454, 111 N.W. 145 (1907). See note 44supra and note 109 & accompanying
text infra.
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was engaged in an unlawful act independent of the homicide. 4 9
The court properly rejected the argument.
The court held that the statute does not change the common
law and cited Blackstone's definition of manslaughter. "The unlawful killing of another, without malice... upon a sudden heat;
or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act.' "5,s
The opinion then referred to an Ohio case construing an identical
Ohio statute and clarified the voluntary and involuntary manslaughter clauses of the statute. Manslaughter may be either a
"killing done in a sudden quarrel," 5 ' or a killing while the slayer is
in the commission of some unlawful act:
In the first class of cases referred to in the statute the homicide must have
been intentional, but in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a reasonable provocation, and without malice; in the latter clause the killing
must have been unintentional, but caused while the slayer was committing some5 2 act prohibited by law and other than rape, arson, robbery or
burglary.

Despite the recognition by the court that the "sudden quartel'
language of the statute refers to the provocation doctrine, it approved the manslaughter instruction used by the trial judge which
merely tracked the statutory language.5 3 The cases of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska do not evidence any situation since
Savary, in 1901, where an instruction informed the jury of the
provocation doctrine. The Nebraska Jury Instructions make no
reference to provocation and the only manslaughter example simply repeats the statutory language.5 4 For over eighty years Nebraska juries have been asked to distinguish between murder in
the second degree and manslaughter without any articulation
given to them of the doctrine of provocation which might justly and
55
morally guide that decision.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909).
Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoamrENTAlEs *191).
Id.
Id.
If you fail to find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and do find, beyond a reasonable doubt from a consideration of
all the evidence in this case and the instructions given you, that the
defendant at the time and place charged in the information did unlawfully kill the said Frank H. Jarmer, without malice, upon a sudden
quarrel, then you will find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and
so say by your verdict.
Id. at 853, 122 N.W. at 75.
54. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUcTIONs, NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS 299 (1969).
55.
'"There is no absolute guarantee that this verbal exploration will reveal the whole truth or that it will avoid the fabrication of satisfying
fictions. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that it
will clarify factors that were only implicitly present in the original
process of inarticulate deliberation."
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Brauniev. State56 illustrates what has come to be the apparent

practice in Nebraska homicide trials. In its instructions the court
defined the crimes of first and second degree murder and manslaughter. Yet, it neglected to instruct that it was adequate provocation which, in a sudden quarrel, would cause the absence of
malice otherwise present in an intentional killing.S7
Braunie, employed as a farm hand, was convicted of murder in
the first degree after he shot his employer who had discharged
him. He argued that the failure to instruct that malice might be
negated by an adequate provocation which would partially excuse
the intent to kill, making the homicide manslaughter was error.5 8
The court noted that in a situation where there was some evidence
of adequate provocation it might be error to fail to instruct as to its
effect on malice. More importantly, perhaps, the court held that
there was no error since all that could be inferred was that the
deceased had provoked the accused by his remarks. 'That such
manner and extent of provocation is insufficient, in law, to mitigate
the offense is beyond question."5 9
There has not yet been a case where the failure to instruct as to
the effect of provocation on malice has been
error when the evi60
dence would support such an instruction.
It would be over fifty years 6' before another issue directly relatE. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 173-74 (1935).
56. 105 Neb. 355, 180 N.W. 567 (1920).
57. Id. at 360, 180 N.W. at 569-70. The Braunie court noted that there was no evidence to support and consequently no duty to instruct on manslaughter. Of
course, in Nebraska when murder is charged the trial court must, without
request, charge on such lesser degrees of homicide as to which the evidence
is properly applicable. State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 315 N.W.2d 255 (1982).
However, the writer has not found a case where a lesser homicide charge
without support has been found to be error.
58. Braunie v. State, 105 Neb. 355, 359, 180 N.W. 567, (1920).
59. Id. at 360, 180 N.W. at 569. Words are not so obviously an inadequate provocation. See note 90 & accompanying text infra. Moreover, the court's reasoning
to support a voluntary manslaughter charge in State v. Rowe suggests that
Braunie may have been silently overruled. See text accompanying note 38
supra.
60. See State v. Newman, 179 Neb. 746, 140 N.W.2d 406 (1966). Cf. Wright v. State,
169 Neb. 497, 504, 100 N.W.2d 51, 56 (1959) (apparently approving an instruction that provocation by words would not negate malice in a case giving second degree and manslaughter charges).
61. During this time several cases obliquely raised issues of provocation. See
Wehenkel v. State, 116 Neb. 493, 218 N.W. 137 (1928) (there is no "unwritten
law" to avenge a wrong done to female family member); Clark v. State, 131
Neb. 370, 268 N.W. 87 (1936) (error to charge first and second degree murder if
evidence only supports manslaughter); Veneziano v. State, 139 Neb. 526, 297
N.W. 920 (1941) (imperfect self-defense); Wright v. State, 169 Neb. 497, 100
N.W.2d 51 (1959) (language no excuse for violence); State v. Kimbrough, 173
Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422 (1962) (imperfect self-defense); State v. Newman, 179
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ing to provocation came before the court. In State v. Bautista,62
the defendant had gotten in a fight outside a bar. He departed and
then ten to twenty-five minutes later returned carrying a rifle. He
asked the father of his assailant where the assailant had gone and
threatened to shoot him if he did not tell him. Hearing no response
Bautista shot the man.
The defendant was convicted of second degree murder after instructions having been given on first degree, second degree and
manslaughter. On appeal, it was argued that it was error to refuse
to give requested instructions on provocation. 63 The court held it
was not error because there was no evidence of reasonable provocation by the victim. "On the contrary, what provocation existed
resulted from the acts of the victim's son, not the victim himself."6 4
The last case to be examined is State v. Beers.6 5 Robert Beers
was driving around Nebraska City looking for his estranged wife
and drinking beer. When two police officers attempted to talk with
him and settle him down he shot at them with a shotgun he was
carrying. One of the officers was killed and Beers was charged and
convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal he argued that
66
it was error to not instruct on manslaughter.
Beers argued that he believed he was fired upon without warning by someone, making it necessary for him to shoot in self-defense. The trial court instructed on self-defense. On appeal the
court affirmed the either-or situation: either Beers was innocent
because the killing was done in self-defense or he was guilty of
67
murder.

62.
63.
64.

65.

Neb. 746, 140 N.W.2d 406 (1966) (lack of provocation instruction not error if
instructed on manslaughter).
193 Neb. 476, 227 N.W.2d 835 (1975).
Id. at 480, 227 N.W.2d at 839.
Id. The notion that provocation must stem from the victim to partially excuse
the intent to kill and reduce the homicide to manslaughter seems to be
widely accepted by the courts. The commentators are less enthusiastic.
LAFAVE & .ScoTr,supra note 1, at 581-82; FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 245-46.
See notes 106-08 & accompanying text infra.
201 Neb. 714, 271 N.W.2d 842 (1978). A year before Beers the court considered
State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497,250 N.W.2d 849 (1977), in which several interesting questions arose. However, there were no new issues presented and the
case will not be discussed here other than to take advantage of a piece of its

language for a rhetorical question. "Even if the facts described above could
be viewed as a 'quarrel,' the trial court was undoubtedly correct in stating
that the evidence did not really show facts constituting manslaughter." 197
Neb. at 514, 250 N.W.2d at 860. Would the doctrine of provocation clarify the
distinction between a "sudden quarrel" deserving of a manslaughter instruction and a sudden killing with malice?
66. State v. Beers, 201 Neb. 714, 716, 271 N.W.2d 842, 844 (1978).
67. Id. at 724-25, 271 N.W.2d at 848.
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Beers does not mention Lucas v. State,68 the leading Nebraska
case for the proposition that an imperfect or unreasonable exercise
of self-defense will reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter.
If he was not actuated by such desire and purpose to kill the deceased
unlawfully, but killed the deceased under a mistaken notion that the circumstances were such as to justify the killing in self-defense, that is, if he
acted unreasonably, rashly and unnecessarily, but with a belief at the time
that the law would justify him in so acting, and without any purpose
or
69
intent to kill the defendant unlawfully, he is guilty of manslaughter.

Because the Beers court approached murder and self-defense in a
black or white manner, it overlooked or avoided the gray area of
what might be an adequate provocation. In fact, the court did not
even discuss provocation, other than to say "there [was] no evi",70
dence of a sudden quarrel ....
IV. A BENCHMARK ARTICULATION OF THE
PROVOCATION DOCTRINE
In a homicide trial the jury must exercise its role as finder of
fact and conscience of the community by determining the grade of
the homicide if they find the accused to have unlawfully caused
the death of another.71 The grade of the homicide turns upon the
presence or absence of malice. It is the thesis of this Article that
the doctrine of provocation is a just and morally defensible principle of the law of Nebraska which may be usefully employed to
guide the jury in determining which homicides are murder and
which are the lesser offense of manslaughter. Without the doctrine of provocation there is not a rational basis for understanding
which intentional killings done "upon a sudden quarrel" should be
found less culpable because of the absence of malice.
The writer suggests the following as a benchmark articulation
of the provocation doctrine:
PROVOCATION MAY NEGATE MALICE, THE INTENT TO
KILL, SO THAT EVEN IF SUCH AN INTENT EXISTS THE LAW
DEEMS IT ABSENT AND THE HOMICIDE WHICH WOULD
68. 78 Neb. 454, 111 N.W. 145 (1907).
69. Id. at 457, 111 N.W. at 146. There are a number of other Nebraska cases recognizing this imperfect self-defense doctrine, that terror though unreasonable
may be an adequate provocation to reduce the intentional killing done under
its influence to manslaughter. See generally Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40
N.W. 420 (1888); Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895); State v. Kimbrough, 173 Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422 (1962). But see Veneziano v.. State, 139
Neb. 526, 297 N.W. 92 (1941); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849
(1977). See note 109 & accompanying text infra.
70. State v. Beers, 201 Neb. at 726, 271 N.W.2d at 849. See also notes 48-53 and
accompanying text supra for the last Nebraska case to clearly interpret the
statutory language, "sudden quarrel," to require a showing of provocation.
71. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2027 (Reissue 1979).
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OTHERWISE BE MURDER IS PARTIALLY EXCUSED AND
PUNISHED AS MANSLAUGHTER WHEN COMMITTED AS A
RESULT OF ADEQUATE PROVOCATION FOR WHICH THERE
IS REASONABLE EXPLANATION OR EXCUSE. THE REASONABLENESS OF SUCH EXPLANATION OR EXCUSE
SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A PERSON IN THE ACTOR'S SITUATION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE ACTOR BELIEVES THEM TO BE.72
Most importantly the jury should be instructed that provocation
is a failure of proof defense arguing the negation of malice. That is,
when the defense has met the burden of pleading and production
on the issue of provocation, the burden of persuasion or proof is
upon the state to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.7 3

V. PROVOCATION ISSUES
The provocation doctrine recognizes that due to constricted
choice from temporally limited circumstances an intent to kill may
be aroused and acted upon which compassion requires the law to
find less culpable. 74 Using the benchmark articulation of the doctrine suggested, the jury as finder of fact and conscience of the
community would be left the task of "distinguishing between those
impulses to kill as to which we as a society demand self-control,
and those as to which we relax our inhibitions." 75 However, the
courts' fear of the jury has resulted in having numerous provocation issues denied jury consideration. 76 Before leaving the provocation doctrine to either bloom or remain dormant in Nebraska, a
brief survey is in order.
72. The articulation of the doctrine draws on the Model Penal Code. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 201.3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also FLETCHER, supra note
6, at 242; PERKINS, supra note 1, at 54; LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 573;
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF

73.

74.
75.
76.

1981, S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 567 (1981) Savary v. State, 62 Neb.
166, 175, 87 N.W. 34, 37 (1901).
See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977); Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
CoLmi. L. REV. 199, 233-34, 256-60 (1982); FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 524-41.
See generally Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases After Pattersonv. New York, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 30 (1977); Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979). See also CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRmNAL, 8.37, 8.40, 8.42 (1979 Revision).
See text accompanying note 19 supra.
FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 247 (describing the basic moral question in the law
of homicide).
Each of these issues could be the subject of an extensive research and discussion. No such effort is within the scope of this Article. The thrust here is
simply to urge that the provocation doctrine be reemployed as a basis for
distinguishing killings with or without malice, murder or manslaughter.
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Provocation and the Intent to Kill

It is clear in Nebraska77 and in most jurisdictions that provocation need not so destroy the mental process of the actor that the
mind is incapable of forming an intent to kill. At one time it was
asserted by the House of Lords that where provocation inspires an
intent to kill the defense would not lie, but that view was soon
found to be an incorrect statement of the law. 78 Thus, "[t]he defense of provocation may arise where a person does intend to kill
or inflict greivous bodily harm but his intention to do so arises
from sudden passion involving loss of self-control by reason of
79
provocation."
B.

The Adequacy of Provocation

The normative character of the provocation doctrine results in
an institutional question of whether the judge or jury decides the
adequacy of provocation.8 O For many years courts assumed that
they must make a preliminary finding that the facts might establish an adequate provocation as a matter of law before allowing the
jury to determine that there was an adequate provocation and that
the intent to kill arose therefrom causing the homicide. The English courts categorized situations that might be adequate provoca2
tion 8 ' and the Americans soon followed.8
Mutual combat harking back to the notion of chance-medley is
everywhere recognized as an adequate provocation.8 3 However,
only a significant blow rather than a technical battery will mitigate
the death dealing blow returned. 84 Moreover, an assault will generally not suffice unless it results in a battery or is unusually violent and death threatening.S5
In an early case the observation of a spouse in an act of adul77. Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909).
78. Compare Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] 2 All E.R. 124 (requires lack of intent) with Lee Chen-Chuen v. Regina [19631 1 All E.R. 73

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

(applies provocation even if an intent to kill is formed). Wisconsin is the only
American jurisdiction taking such a view. See Johnson v. State, 129 Wis. 146,
160, 108 N.W. 55, 60-61 (1906). See generally LAFAvE &Scorr, supra note 1, at
572-73.
Lee Chen-Cheun v. Regina [1963] 1 All E. 73, 77. See also Edwards, The
Doctrine of Provocation, 69 LAW Q. REv. 547, 548 (1953).
FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 243.
See note 22 supra. Since the Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz., ch. 11, § 3,
English juries have increased ability to hear provocation issues without judicial approval of their preliminary adequacy.
See generally Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRum. L, CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 391, 410-22 (1946).
PERInS, supra note 1, at 57-59; LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 574-75.
LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 574; PEmus, supra note 1, at 60.
LAFAVE & Scort, supra note 1, at 575; PERKINs, supra note 1, at 61.
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tery was found to be adequate provocation and the notion has been
universally recognized. 86 Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to
find a killing in such circumstances completely justified.87 Ne88
braska has specifically rejected this so-called "unwritten law."
Under the category approach, the most controversial area is the
notion that words alone will never be adequate provocation. 89 Yet,
courts have regularly distinguished instances of insulting words
which would be inadequate from factual reports of events which if
observed would be adequate provocation and have held that in the
latter event the jury may consider the matter.90
The modern tendency is to leave the category approach in favor
of the view that upon a proper instruction the jury is to consider all
of the evidence of the facts and circumstances. 91 The law has attempted to search for an objective standard and has employed a
92
concept well used in such a quest, the reasonableperson. Commentators were quick to point out that the reasonable person does
not kill at all, 9 3 and the current fashion is to ask whether the facts
86. "[T]here could not be greater provocation than this." Manning's Case, T.
Raym. 212, 83 Eng. Rep. 112 (1793). LAFAVE & ScOar, supra note 1, at 575-76;
PERKINS, supra note 1, at 64-65. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *
191.
87. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 576; PERKINS, supra note 1, at 64. Interestingly in the Holmes case, which had said that provocation must completely
negate the intent to kill, one exception was made for the observation of a
spouse in an act of adultery. Holmes v. DPP [1946] 2 All E.R. 124.
88. Wehenkel v. State, 116 Neb. 493, 495, 218 N.W. 137, 138 (1928); Note, The Unwritten Law as D:fense to Homicide, 19 NEB. L. REV. 146, 147 (1940).
89. Nebraska took this position in Braunie v. State, 105 Neb. 355, 180 N.W. 567
(1920) and Wright v. State, 169 Neb. 497, 100 N.W.2d 51 (1959). However, the
court's conclusion in Rowe that an instruction was required on voluntary
manslaughter hopefully may indicate that it is moving away from categories
and toward allowing jury consideration of all the evidence. Rowe v. State, 210
Neb. 419, 425, 315 N.W.2d 250, 255 (1982). Such an approach should be guided
by a specific provocation instruction.
90. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 1, at 576-77; PERINS, supra note 1, at 61-63;
Anno., 2 A.L.R.3d 1292 (1965). Compare, Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa.
447, 113 A.2d 293 (1959) (words of provocation not sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter); People v. Lopez, 93 M. App. 2d 426, 235 N.E.2d 652
(1968) (mere words do not constitute provocation) with State v. Flory, 40
Wyo. 184,276 P. 458 (1929) (killing of father-in-law on information of rape and
incest held to be adequate provocation); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81
A.D. 781 (1862) (killing of alleged adulterer upon receipt of information by
husband could be manslaughter). See also People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121,
169 P.2d 1 (1946).
91. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 65.
92. See, e.g., Comment, Manslaughterand the Adequacy of Provocation: The
Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1958).
93. Williams, Provocationand the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRI. L. REV. 740, 742
(1954); FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 247; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 1, at 573.
The notion seems implausible in light of the many relatives of the writer who
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and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinary person so that he was liable to act rashly or without due
94
deliberation and reflection, rather than from judgment.
This formulation of the adequacy test nevertheless tends to exclude attention to the special human circumstances of the actor.
The benchmark articulation of provocation offered here attempts
to steer a middle course between a doctrine which ignores all individuality and one which would partially excuse any killing done
under emotional distress. 9 5 An actor lives in the world of human
beings as well as the heaven of legal concepts, and the requirement of "reasonable explanation or excuse" to be "determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as the actor believes them to be" allows flexibility
to sort those factors peculiar to the accused's situation that ought
96
to be taken into account from those properly ignored.
C.

Mistake

Few cases involve a mistake as to the actor's perception of a
provoking event. However, it is a general notion of the criminal
law that a reasonable mistake of fact will negate the mens rea of an
offense. 97 Similarly, in self-defense an actor will be justified if acting with a reasonable but erroneous belief. Thus, the authors of a
leading treatise argue that the killer should be partially excused if
acting with a reasonable but mistaken belief as to the provoking

94.

95.
96.

97.

have gone to war. The same experience causes pause with the notion that
words alone will not be an adequate provocation. See Edwards, Provocation
and the Reasonable Man-Another View, 1954 Cprvi. L REv. 898, 901 (1954).
LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 1, at 573; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220
(1862); People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 556 P.2d 777, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1976);
CALIFORNiA JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRUIMNAL, § 8.42 (1979 Revision). An excellent discussion and careful analysis of the reasonable person under the
Homicide Act of 1957 is presented in Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation,
35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 (1976).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 commentary at 48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
For surely if the actor had just suffered a traumatic injury, if he were
blind or were distraught with grief, if he were experiencing an unanticipated reaction to a therapeutic drug, it would be deemed atrocious to appraise his crime for purposes of sentence without
reference to any of these matters. They are material because they
bear upon the inference as to the actor's character that it is fair to
draw upon the basis of his act.
Id. A good discussion of the conflict between the "reasonable man" and the
Anglo-American notion of individual mental state as the basis for criminal
guilt may be found at Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?
A CriticalPerspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L REV.
435 (1981). See also Howard, What ColourIs the Reasonable Man 1961 Csroi.
L. REv. 41 (1961); O'Reagan, Sorcery and Homicide in PapuaNew Guinea, 48
AusTL. L.J. 76 (1974).
LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 356-68; PEmaNs, supra note 1, at 939-43.
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incident.9 8 The provocation doctrine articulated here is in accord.
D. Cooling Time
The Nebraska cases recognizing the provocation doctrine as inherent in the distinction of murder and manslaughter state the
doctrine in its traditional form that requires asking "Whether,
under all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence,
a reasonable time had elapsed from the time of the provocation to
the instant of the killing for the passion to subside and reason resume control of the mind." 99 The majority view appears to be that
the jury is told not to reduce the homicide to manslaughter if the
time between the provoking act and the fatality is such that a reasonable person, provoked as was the accused, would have cooled,
even if it is clear that the defendant had not, in fact, cooled during
that time.00 However, in some cases courts have held as a matter
of law that the time between provocation and fatality was so great
that the jury might not consider manslaughter. 01
State v. Gounagiasl0 2 is often criticized for its rigid application
of the cooling time notion.103 In Gounagias the defendant had suffered a sodomizing assault by the deceased while the former was
unconscious. The victim circulated the story among the accused's
friends causing them to taunt Gounagias. Several days after the
assault as a result of insults from his acquaintances, the defendant
killed the deceased. The court held that evidence of provocation
was inadmissible due to the cooling time rule.
Unfortunately, the lapse of time may exaggerate rather than decrease the provocation. 104 Moreover, the cooling time rule does not
easily recognize that a defendant whose passion has cooled from a
provoking event may have that passion rekindled to a greater effect upon a new occurrence that in itself may seem trivial.105 Cooling time should be deleted from an articulation of the provocation
doctrine and reliance should be placed on the need for "reasonable
explanation or excuse."
98. LAFAvE & Scow, supra note 1, at 577-78. See State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 50 A.
37 (1901) (husband mistaken as to observation of adultery).
99. Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 175, 87 N.W. 34, 38 (1901). See Boche v. State, 84
Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909).
100. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 1, at 579; PERKINS, supra note 1, at 67-68; FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 244-45.
101. See State v. Gounagias, 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915) (elapsed time of two
weeks); In re Fraley, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 109 P. 295 (1910) (nine or ten months).
102. 88 Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915).
103. LAFAVE & Scow, supra note 1, at 581 n.66; PERKINS, supra note 1, at 67.
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 commentary at 48 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959).
105. LAFAVE & Scow, supra note 1, at 580.
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Death of a Non-Provoking Victim

It has been argued here that the provocation doctrine is a par-

tial excuse. 0 6 Yet, Nebraska has followed the lead of other jurisdictions in holding that the defense is not available where the
victim is a non-provoking party.107 Perhaps because the victim is
usually the provoking party, the courts are misled to understand
the doctrine as some notion of justification, that the victim justly
deserved to die.108 However, as a partial excuse due to constricted
choice from temporally limited circumstances, it should be irrelevant that the victim of the provocation is innocent of wrongdoing.
F.

Imperfect Self-Defense

Early Nebraska cases allowed a manslaughter instruction
where the actor held a genuine but unreasonable fear of death or

great bodily harm. 109 However, in State v. Beers" o the court took

an all or nothing approach that would either justify the defendant's
acts or restrict his guilt to murder. There does not appear to be
any reason to deny that fear, though unreasonable as to self-defense, may be the basis of a reasonable explanation or excuse
causing adequate provocation."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of provocation lies fallow in the law of Nebraska.

Juries are left unguided other than by a recitation of the murder
and manslaughter statutes as to a rational and morally defensible
distinction between a killing with or without malice. Those who
106. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
107. State v. Bautista, 193 Neb. 476, 227 N.W.2d 835 (1975). See also Goddis v.
State, 207 Miss. 508, 42 So. 2d 724 (1949); State v. Vinso, 171 Mo. 576, 71 S.W.
1034 (1903).
108. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 245. See also O'Reagan, Indirect Provocationand
Misdirected Retaliation,1968 CRim. L. REv. 319 (1968).
109. See Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40 N.W. 420 (1888); Housh v. State, 43 Neb.
163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895); Lucas v. State, 78 Neb. 454, 111 N.W. 145 (1907);
Veneziano v. State, 139 Neb. 526, 297 N.W. 92 (1941); State v. Kimbrough, 173
Neb. 873, 115 N.W.2d 422 (1962). See generally Note, Are There Circumstances
Other Than Provocation Which May "Reduce" Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter, 36 Ky. LJ. 443 (1948).
110. 201 Neb. 714, 271 N.W.2d 842 (1978).
111. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 1, at 583-85. PERKINs, supra note 1, at 69-70;
State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 (1929); Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231
Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911).
The defense is particularly important in cases of spouse abuse. See Note,
PartiallyDetermined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and
Tells Why, 34 STAN. L, REV. 615 (1982) (partial excuse and self-defense in the
context of the battered wife).
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would judge others under law should look to the past heritage of
the provocation doctrine that they may deal with justice and mercy
in the present and walk humbly into the future.

